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DDI #01192-85

11 March 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: D/CPAS

SUBJECT: INR Crisis Management Procedures

Would you please get back to Dick Clarke at INR and tell him that I have asked you to be his point of contact on these crisis management procedures. Assure him that you will consult with me and with the appropriate regional offices about whether we should have somebody participate in his individual task forces. I think it is better that he have the Operations Center's and your phone numbers where he can deal directly with people who know what our coverage is. We should probably send a note to the office directors informing them of these procedures. They would benefit from reading Abramowitz's memo which gives some interesting background on how State handles these task forces.


John L. Helgerson
Associate Deputy Director
for Intelligence

Attachment:

DDI 01254X-86, dtd 6 Mar 86

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SUBJECT: INR Crisis Management Procedures

ADDI/JLHelgerson: (11Mar86)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH
WASHINGTON

DDI-01254X-86

March 6, 1986

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MEMORANDUM TO: DIA/JS - RADM Brooks
NSA - Mr. Rich
✓ CIA/DDI - Mr. Helgeson
CIA/ADDO

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SUBJECT: INR Crisis Management Procedures


As we have recently discussed, INR has formalized its procedures for participation in Department of State crisis management Task Forces. A description of the procedures is attached.

When INR activates an Intell Cell for a State crisis management Task Force I will inform each of you personally, or someone you designate. At that time we will ask if you would designate a point of contact for the State Task Force Intell Cell, either an officer in your own crisis action team/watch office or someone in your regional office. The Intell Cell will request regular, predesignated times for secure telephone exchanges with your agency's point of contact.

In past crises, Intelligence Community agencies have wanted to place liaison officers or observers in the State Task Force. You will be welcome to do in the future, however, we request that such observers be designated to me or the Intell Cell by you or your agency's point of contact. This procedure will allow us to confirm that those who show up have a verified need-to-know and are from the appropriate part of your agency. Liaison officers from your agency would serve as part of the Intell Cell.

The procedures we have instituted for our own Task Forces are in addition to the previously agreed special action coordination cell which may be activated in the NMIC for coordination of special military activities.

If you have any questions or suggestions about our crisis management procedures, I would be glad to discuss them with you (black 647-2402, green 5209).


Richard A. Clarke
Deputy Assistant
Secretary

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH
WASHINGTON

March 4, 1986

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MEMORANDUM TO: Office Directors
FROM: Morton I. Abramowitz *[Signature]*
SUBJECT: Bureau Crisis Management Procedures

Having reviewed recent crises (TWA, Achille Lauro, Philippines), INR has adopted new crisis management procedures to support the principals and the Task Forces in major incidents. Deputy Assistant Secretary Clarke will be the Bureau's supervisor of crisis management procedures. We will tailor our personnel and reporting procedures to the individual crises and announce them when the crisis develops. In general DAS Clarke or Kahan will direct Bureau crisis operations during these events, reporting to me or PDAS McNeil. This memorandum outlines the general structure for the Bureau's crisis management organization.

Structure

The Department's crisis manager is the Undersecretary (P). He is usually supported by an informal "Policy Cell." The S/S-O Task Force for major crises will consist of three units:

- o A Core Cell, including NEA, EUR, PM, etc.
- o A Public Cell, including PA, H, and CA.
- o An Intell Cell, manned by INR and including DIA, CIA, and NSA liaison officers if they choose to attend.

The Intell Cell: Mission

A decision will be made when a Task Force is created by S/S whether it requires an Intell Cell. If an Intell Cell is established, it will be manned 24 hours a day during the crisis (unless otherwise designated) by one officer and one secretary. It will be in a separate room with its own secure telephone. The duties of the INR officer will be:

- o to be the State Department point of contact for all intelligence agencies; to host CIA, DIA, and NSA liaison officers if those agencies wish to have an officer in the State Task Force;

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- o to work with Department principals involved in the crisis to task special collection by NSA, CIA, and DIA;

- o to control all codeword material, receive raw and evaluated intelligence from INR/CIS and the relevant INR offices for briefing to the Policy Cell and the Core Cell and to maintain "clip-board" files of intelligence;

- o to create evaluated intelligence from raw material for briefing;

- o to maintain an hourly contact on secure phone with crisis cells at the NSOC, NMIC, and CIA;

- o to maintain intelligence resource material and maps in support of the Task Force;

- o to maintain an Intelligence Log of events and information;

- o to verify codeword clearances of State Department and visiting personnel by maintaining a copy of the INR Access Roster and liasing as necessary with EX/SB.

- o to give intelligence briefings to Department personnel who will be periodically briefed by the Task Force in the S/S-O Principals' Conference Room.

Procedures

The INR officer in the Intell Cell should maintain close communications with 1) the rest of the Task Force, 2) the INR offices engaged in supporting analysis, and 3) INR/OD.

The Intell Cell will issue its reports (raw or evaluated intell) to the Policy Cell and the Core Cell in a chronologically numbered sequence of Spot Reports.

Taskings to INR from the Task Force, P, or S/S will be sent through the Intell Cell, which will monitor their preparation and submit status reports to the S/S officer in the Core Cell whose job it is to track taskings.

There will be three Task Force teams (A,B,C) each of which will stand eight hour watches. Their composition will be the same from day to day. The INR officer in the Intell Cell will be a member of the team, will change shifts with the rest of the team, and will support the Team Leader in the Core Group.

The INR/CIS staff will go on overtime or leave cancel status as necessary during a crisis to provide an augmented Watch. The Watch will act in direct support of the Intell

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Cell, providing it rapidly with incoming cables and press reports. The Watch will utilize the Flashboard at the request of the Intell Cell rep and will inform him immediately of all information that comes in over Flashboard.

Officers and secretaries assigned to the Intell Cell are not to be tasked by their offices for other duties during the duration of the crisis; i.e., no required work after or during their 8-hour shift.

Contact with other intelligence agency crisis cells should be regularized by calling their cells or watch staffs and asking for a designated liaison officer. Calls to that liaison officer would then be made hourly or at other predesignated times to deal with secure phone circuit load; e.g., CIA on the hour, NSA on the half hour, and DIA at the three-quarter hour mark. It may be necessary to request NSA to adopt expedited dissemination procedures, such as reading over a secure line critical material immediately upon receipt.

INR/INC may establish a special coordination cell in the NMIC. If that cell is activated, the Intell Cell officer in the State Task Force should also establish regular liaison with the INR/INC rep on duty there.

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